RSA cryptography is still widely used. Some of its applications (e.g., distributed signature schemes, cryptosystems) do not allow the RSA modulus to be generated by a centralized trusted entity. Instead, the factorization must remain unknown to all the network participants. To this date, the existing algorithms are either computationally expensive, or limited to two-party settings. In this work, we design a decentralized multi-party computation algorithm able to generate efficiently the RSA modulus. * vidal.attias@iota.org † luigxi.vigneri@iota.org ‡ vassil@iota.org paper with a discussion about network overhead and algorithm complexity in Section 5.
Introduction
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) [14] is one of the first public key encryption systems, and it is still widely used. RSA uses the product of two large prime numbers p and q to compute a public modulus N . The security of RSA is guaranteed by the difficulty of the integer factorization of the public modulus: its factorization would provide the prime numbers p and q and, thus, the corresponding private key.
The simplest technique to generate RSA keys is by using an agent trusted by the parties who does not disclose the factorization. However, many applications using RSA (e.g., distributed signature schemes [12] , threshold cryptosystems [11] , multi party computations [8] ) require to generate the RSA keys in a distributed way. In other contexts, for instance when using verifiable delay functions [4] for spam prevention in distributed ledger technologies [7] , the private key does not have to be computed, and the algorithm require the decentralized generation of the public modulus only.
In this document, we propose a multi-party protocol generating a public RSA modulus, which extends the state-of-the-art two-party algorithm discussed in [Frederiksen] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we present the previous work on RSA key generation, and in Section 3 we review in detail the fastest algorithm to date [Frederiksen] ; then, in Section 4, we describe our algorithm working in a multi-party setting; after that, we conclude our 3 Frederiksen's protocol 3 .1 Algorithm set up
Objective
The algorithm aims to generate two large prime random numbers p and q of the same order (i.e., having the same bit-length) and the distributed computation of their product N = p · q. The numbers p and q are k-bit numbers, i.e., p, q ∈ [1, 2 k ]. A fundamental requirement is that none of the party involved in the computation can be able to retrieve either p or q.
System model
Consider a network made of a set N of two nodes P 1 , P 2 ∈ N which decide to collaborate to run the protocol. The protocol makes the following additional assumptions:
A.1 Semi-honest participants. Both nodes follow the protocol. However, one of them could try to guess the secret shares of the other one to retrieve the factorization of the public modulus.
A.2 Reliable networking layer. Every message is received in the same way it has been sent with probability one and in finite time.
Protocol outline
At a high level, the proposed algorithm involves the following steps: P.1 Random number generation. The two active nodes P 1 and P 2 respectively generate the numbers p 1 , q 1 and p 2 , q 2 .
P.2 Fast trial divisions. The active nodes run fast trial divisions by small primes numbers on both p = p 1 + p 2 and q = q 1 + q 2 to quickly discard wrong candidates. If p or q fail the test, the algorithm restarts from P.1.
P.3 RSA modulus computation. The two parties compute N = (p 1 + p 2 ) · (q 1 + q 2 ) in a distributed way without revealing information on key's parts.
P.4 Biprimality test.
A biprimality test verifies whether N is a product of two prime numbers whp. If the biprimality test fails, the algorithm restarts from P.1.
In the next subsection, we will describe rigorously each part of the protocol.
Detailed protocol

Random number generation
The goal of this step, is for node P 1 (resp. P 2 ) to pick two numbers p 1 , q 1 ∈ [0, 2 k − 1] (resp. p 2 , q 2 ∈ [0, 2 k − 1]). Let p p 1 + p 2 and1 + q 2 be the sum of the number generated by the two nodes. However the biprimality test (step P.4 of the protocol) requires
Hence, the protocol enforces that P 1 (resp. P 2 ) randomly picks two numberŝ p 1 ,q 1 ∈ [1, 2 k−2 ] (resp.p 2 ,q 2 ∈ [1, 2 k−2 ]). After that, node P 1 (resp. node P 2 ) concatenates two zeros (resp. two ones) to satisfy Eq. (1), i.e., p 1 p 1 ||{0; 0} and q 1 q 1 ||{0; 0} (resp. p 2 p 2 ||{1; 1} and q 2 q 2 ||{1; 1}).
Fast trial divisions
As a protocol optimization, we can discard some trivial non-prime candidates to reduce the number of the algorithm iterations. The idea is to divide the candidates with small prime numbers.
Let B ∈ N be a certain threshold, which indicates the number of prime numbers that we want to test. For each prime β < B, P 1 and P 2 run a βdivisibility test for p and q. The β-divisibility test consists in computing the remainder of (p 1 + p 2 )(mod β) while keeping secret p 1 and p 2 . The above is described in algorithm 1. The parties test if p 1 +p 2 ≡ 0 (mod β) or, equivalently, p 1 ≡ −p2 (mod β). We use the 1-out-of-β Oblivious Transfer (OT) algorithm 2 to hide the rest of the modulus β of p 2 to P 1 . The same test has to be ran for q.
In the algorithm, P 1 inputs {r 0 , . . . , r β−1 } ∈ [0, 2 k − 1] β to the OT, while P 2 requests r −p2(mod β) from the OT and send it to P 1 . Then, P 1 can check if r −p2(mod β) = r p1(mod β) : if yes, then p1 ≡ −p 2 (modβ) and the protocol has to be restarted.
Finally, one can note that this step is parallelizable by running different β-divisibility tests simultaneously with different values of β.
RSA modulus computation
This step aims to compute the product between p and q, i.e.,
While the terms p 1 · q 1 and p 2 · q 2 can be computed locally by P 1 and P 2 , the two remaining terms must be computed in a distributed way. To this end, the protocol defines the procedure distr product.
Let us assume P 1 knows a ∈ N and P 2 knows b ∈ N, and the two nodes want to compute a · b without disclosing their number to the other party. Moreover, let l max(⌊log 2 (a)⌋ + 1, ⌊log 2 (b)⌋ + 1)
be the minimum number of bits necessary to represent a and b. Then, given an input x ∈ N, for bit i, we can define the function
Note that we count bits from the least significant digit. For each bit i of x, P 1 generates
and the instantiates an OT with {c 0 i , c 1 i } as an input. Then, P 2 requests c
and P 2 computes
Hence,
To calculate p 1 · q 2 + q 1 · p 2 without information leakage, P 1 will compute s p 1 (resp. s q 1 ) and P 2 will compute s q 2 (resp. s p 2 ) by running distr product(p 1 , q 2 ) (resp. distr product(q 1 , p 2 )). Finally, P 1 will share s p 1 + s q 1 with P 2 and P 2 will share s p 2 + s q 2 such as
Importantly, the algorithm allows each party to only have partial information of the output, while their sum is the exact output. In order to dissimulate information, the parties only share the sum of all the partial product they compute.
Both parties keep s 1 and s 2 secret for future usage Algorithm 3 Distributed computation of p · q P1 and P2 compute respectively α 2 1 and β 1 2 via distr product of p 1 q 2 P1 and P2 compute respectively β 2 1 and α 1 2 via distr product
and P2 share f 1 and f 2 to compute N = f 1 + f 2
Biprimality test
This test, inspired by [5] , is composed of two parts, and requires to perform s times a random filtering test.
Then the parties verify in a distributed way that gcd(N, p + q − 1) = 1.
Algorithm 5 Distributed test of gcd(N, p + 1 − 1) P1 and P2 generate respectively r 1 and r 2 in Z N They compute shares α 1 ,
Both parties check that gdc(s 1 + s 2 , N ) = 1 and return ⊤ otherwise return ⊥
Generalization to n participants
The aforementioned two-party protocol is proven to work securely in a semihonest environment. Here, we will present our generalization to n parties while keeping the same high-level structure. Also, we make sure that the computational complexity and the network overhead are reasonably low, to keep the efficiency of the algorithm similar to the one in [Frederiksen].
System model
We consider a set N of n ∈ N nodes which participates to the protocol. We refer to node i as P i . For the sake of simplicity, we assume the number of participants to be n = 2 t , where t ∈ N.
We keep the assumption of a perfect networking layer and semi-honest participants. However, we also consider the scenario where some of them can collude and communicate their private information in order to derive the private key. From the point of view of an honest node, it is not possible to detect such a behaviour as all nodes actually follow the protocol.
Key's parts generation
Each node P i has to generate a pair p i , q i ∈ [1, 2 k ]. Moreover, we define p n i=1 p i and q n i=1 q i . Since, the biprimality test requires that p ≡ 3(mod4) and q ≡ 3(mod4) (see Eq. (1)), the protocol enforces that:
• P 1 randomly picks two numbersp 1 ,q 1 ∈ [1, 2 k−2 ] and concatenates two ones to satisfy Eq. (1), i.e., p 1 p 1 ||{1; 1} and q 1 q 1 ||{1; 1}
• all the other nodes i, where i ∈ N − {1}, randomly picks two numberŝ p i ,q i ∈ [1, 2 k−2 ], and concatenates two zeros, i.e., p i p i ||{0; 0} and q i q i ||{0; 0}.
Node P 1 can be selected through leader election (potentially based on some node characteristics, such as reputation or hash). We note that the selection of this node does not influence the outcome of the protocol, as it only affects the generation of the two last bits of its secret numbers.
Fast trial divisions
Generalizing the β-division to n parties is complicated as the original algorithm was specifically designed for two parties. We unstress the constraint of using OTs to communicate the secret shares remainder modulus β. Our β-division works in t turns. We set N 0 = N and during the first turn, there is a consensus on a selection of a subset N 1 ⊂ N and a bijection f 1 : N 0 \ N 1 → N 1 between N 1 and the set of non-selected nodes. Each non-selected node i will send its secret share p i mod β to its associated node j in N 1 which will sum it with its own secret share modulus β. In the second turn, we will again select a subset N 2 ⊂ N 1 of half of the nodes in N 1 and a bijection
between the selected and non-selected nodes such that the non-selected nodes will send the sum of the private share modulus β they know. And the algorithm will iteratively divide the selected sets until only N t which contains only one node that will be able to output if i∈N p i mod β == 0. The algorithm 6 shows a pseudocode of this procedure.
The major issue in this algorithm is how to construct f k : N k−1 \ N k → N k in a decentralized way such that everybody have the same and with a minimum amount of communications. We propose in algorithm 7 a way to solve this problem using a deterministic attribution of the associations using a hashing function preventing malicious parties to manipulate this part of the protocol. We assume the parties agree before the fast trials part on a seed and a certain hashing function H such that we can construct H m : {0, 1} * → [1, m] for m ∈ N.The way this seed and H are generated depends on the network's goals and policies but they can agree to use the SHA256 hashing function and generate the seed using a distributed number generator. This technique allows to have no communication for finding consensus during the protocol.
Algorithm 6 Generalization of the fast trial division
The input of the hashing function in this algorithm contains β, seed,k and j.
• β is here to change the output of the function at each division trial to prevent people from getting information from the same parties each time without having to agree on a new seed each time.
• k plays the same role be between each turn of one β-division
• j is here to make sure that A is a permutation of [1, m] and does not contain twice the same number while allowing people to compute on their own without communicating.
Distributed multiplication
In this subsection, we want to compute i p i · i q i in a similar way to the Frederiksen's algorithm. First, note that
The first term of the left hand side of Equation 2 can be computed solely by every party. As for the second term, for each pair i, j ∈ N 2 with i < j, the nodes P i and P j have to compute p i · q j + p j · q i in a distributed way without disclosing their secret shares. We then suggest that P i and P j run the distr product routine and compute x j,p i for P i and x i,q j for P i for computing p i · q j and respectively they would compute x j,q i and x i,p j while computing p j · q i . Finally, we have for each party P i , P i computes
and broadcast it to everyone so that everybody can compute N = n i=1 f i . At that point, N is a public information to everyone.
We compute p i q j and p j q i as in algorithm 9
The parties share f i ∀iN to compute N ← 
Biprimality test
First part
In this section we keep the same idea of testing for a certain γ randomly generated if γ N +1−p−q = ±1. This part can be easily done in a decentralized way with properties offered by the exponentiation. The parties elect a leader P e that will generate a number γ ∈ Z × N with Jacobi symbol over N equal to 1 and shares it with everybody. Then each party P i , i ∈ N will compute γ i = γ −pi−qi and send it to P e . Once P e received all the gamma i , it will
broadcasts ⊤ otherwise it broadcasts ⊥. The algorithm 10 gives the details of this procedure. This test returns ⊤ if N is composite of two prime numbers but have a probability of 1/2 to return ⊤ otherwise. Therefore, in order to increase the reliability of this algorithm, the parties should run it s time with s such that 1 2 n is a probability low enough to return ⊤ for a wrong modulus.
Algorithm 10 First discriminating biprimalty test Parties elect a party P e P s generates γ ∈ Z × N and shares with everybody for party P i (including P e )
We can see it is important for γ to be in Z × N in order to be able to compute negative exponents by using γ −1 . The way of electing P e . A way that can be done is using the hashing function and the seed defined in the fast trial divisions in order to elect implicitly the leading party at each trial without requiring further communications.
Second part
In this part, we want compute gcd( i∈N r i ·( i∈N p i + i∈N q i − 1), N ) where r i is a number generated by a node i ∈ N . Let ∆ i = p i + q i , i ∈ N . In the same idea as for the distributed multiplication, we can rewrite
The have the same schema as for the distributed multiplication whith the first term of the left hand of Equation 3 which can be computed solely by a node and the other term has to be computed using distr product. Finally they share all the sum g i of their parts of computation similarly to f i in the distributed multiplication and they compute G = i∈N g i mod N . Finally each node can verify on its own wether gcd(G, N ) = 1. If so, the modulus N can be used, otherwise, the protocol has to be restarted.
Algorithm 11 Second discriminating biprimality test g i ← 0 for i ∈ N Each party i generate a secret random number
We compute r i ∆ j and r j ∆ i as in algorithm 9
The parties share g i mod N ∀i ∈ N to compute G = n i=1 g i mod N if gcd(G, N ) = 1 then N is considered to be sure
Network overhead
Here we present a theoretical analysis of the amount of communications necessary for a successful try. We use br as an abbreviation for "broadcast".
Fast trial divisions
Considering a single division, if we consider for simplicity we have n = 2 t participants, we have t steps where for the i-th step, 2 t−i parties send their values to someone else. In the worst case, which is the node which will return the value, it makes log 2 (n) communications to receive the data plus one communication to return the result. In the best case, which is a node communicating it's private share modulus the small prime at the first round, it only makes on connection to give and one to receive the output. So we have for B different fast trial divisions, each party operates the following amount of communications:
• Worst-Case : B · (log 2 (n) + 1)
• Best-Case : 2 · B
Distributed multiplication
Let us count for a single multiplication of a · b with two k-bits numbers. For each bit the two parties instantiate an OT and either input or receives a value from it which makes k communications per party. Then as each party computes two product with the other parties, they operate 2k(n − 1) communications plus 2k(n − 1) OT instantiations. Finally we have a question of how sharing the final values in order to add everything to get N . We can suppose everyone broadcasts their final value f i . Finally we get 2k(n − 1) + n communications per party for the distributed multiplication plus 2k(n − 1) oblivious transfer initializations.
Biprimality test -First part
In this part, the chosen party to generate γ only broadcasts the value of γ, then the other parties communicate their exponentiation with a single communication and finally the first party communicates the output with a broadcast.
Then we have for each party according to the role during the s trials
• Worst-Case : s · (1 + (n − 1) + 1) = s · (n + 1)
• Best-Case : 3 · s
Biprimality test -Second part
Here we have something really similar to the distributed multiplication part except the multiplications ar 2k bits longs here. Then each party operates 4k(n − 1) + n communications plus 4k(n − 1) OT instantiations.
We can see the theoretical amount of communication is linear with the growth of n and k so we have a quadratic growth of the global amount of communications. Furthermore, we can parallelize a great part of the steps. For example we can run various fast trial divisions in parallel with a different prime number and massively parallelize the multiplications.
